City of Miami Beach Accused of Fraud

CMB Accused Fraud IMG



June 20, 2015

By David Arthur Walters


Rod Eisenberg, owner of the historic 80-year old Sadigo Court Apartment Hotel in South Beach, accused City of Miami Beach attorneys in a June 4, 2015 filing in federal court of dishonesty; to wit, of making blatant and gross misrepresentations and brazenly false arguments supported by convenient cutting and pasting together of statutes as part of a massive scheme to deceive, mislead and defraud the courts where he had lodged complaints to defend his property and his civil rights after city officials conspired to throw his guests onto the street, close his apartment hotel, and subject him to false arrest because he refused to voluntarily install fire sprinklers that were not really required for his historic structure.

His previous filings asserted that he was persecuted by the city in retaliation for 1) his exposure of corrupt practices in the early 1990s, and 2) for his complaints about non-enforcement of code provisions in respect to blight in his neighborhood, and 3) for failing to bribe code enforcement officers.

Eisenberg discovered that the city’s bid selection process was corrupt in 1993 after bidding to rent space at the old city hall building for a Welcome Center. That motivated him to take city officials to task on other matters.

He learned the winning bidder was receiving free rent in the Old City Hall during the bid challenge. He also discovered a City commissioner and his son had received what amounted to an illegal brokerage commission on a $10 million real estate transaction. He subsequently embarrassed city officials by disclosing his findings to the media.

As a result of those disclosures and his lawsuit against the city, a scandal ensued that ultimately led to the city manager resigning, and the city attorney being forced out. Some of the current city attorneys including City Attorney Raul Aguila were involved in that case. I have examined Raul Aguila representation of the city in other matters, and found him to be quite fair in comparison to his predecessor, Jose Smith, who seemed to believe that the city was not the community but the ruling regime, and indeed acted like he was the city itself, although he was right more times than he was wrong—he was nicknamed “The Magic Eight Ball.” So Aguila’s stance in the Eisenberg Affair astonished me.

Furthermore, the discovery process Eisenberg brought against the city back then revealed apparent hanky panky between city officials and an officer of IRAMCO, the broker involved in City of Miami Beach Redevelopment Agency’s purchase of land for the development of the city’s first convention hotel, now Loews Hotel at 1601 Collins Avenue.

Between 2004 and 2009, Plaintiffs and others in the neighborhood voiced many complaints about the health and safety risks and Code compliance violations of an abandoned hotel in the neighborhood. The City investigated some of those complaints but did not resolve the problems with the building.

In December 2011, fifteen police offers, ten code enforcement officers, including Jose Alberto, and five fire officials forcibly shut down the Sadigo for a second time for allegedly violating city fire codes for refusing to install fire sprinklers in the three-story structure. Yet Les Beilinson, a renowned architect and historic preservationist, called the Sadigo “one of the safest buildings I have ever been in” during a 2010 Task Force hearing.

The shut down occurred while the Sadigo was hosting the ‘Pool Art Fair’ during the Art Basel Miami Beach art show, forcing guests to vacate the premises within the hour. Jose Alberto, later convicted and imprisoned for corruption elsewhere, allegedly offered to solve Eisenberg’s problems by using his people, insinuating a bribe would be due from Eisenberg. I estimate from information of past incidents the handling fees might have amounted to $500 for six people, or $3,000. When Eisenberg refused by stating he already had legal counsel working on the matter, Alberto allegedly stated that Eisenberg would not get far using legal means. Eisenberg was then arrested. In April 2012, Alberto and other code compliance officers and fire department inspectors were arrested for bribes they accepted in June 2011.

Since those arrests, the Sadigo has not received any further code compliance notices or violations, according to a recent brief filed in the federal case; however, a $400,000 lien was filed against the property for a fine accruing at $500 a day. Eisenberg has laid out an estimated $450,000 in attorney fees and is being sued for another $200,000 in fees he refuses to pay his attorneys for losing the case. The loss in revenue from the extended closure of the hotel along with damage to his reputation may amount to another $1,000,000. Now that the federal judge had summarily dismissed the case, ensuring that his complaints will never be heard by a jury, the city has filed what appears to be a patently frivolous motion for sanctions for an amazing $800,000 in legal fees and costs for taking him to hell and back, refusing at all times to compromise with his attorneys.

Eisenberg is no slouch when it comes to the practice of law. He trained as an attorney. He did not apply for a license, apparently because he eventually believed the profession is essentially unethical. The allegations he has brought pro se in response to the city’s motion for around $800,000 sanctions indicts not only the city attorneys but his own attorneys as well. He claimed that they colluded wittingly or unwittingly to keep the case going in order to use him as an ATM machine.

“Although there is no guarantee of success in civil litigation, a plaintiff must be certain his attorneys are not succumbing to the City’s arguments because they would rather treat their client like an ATM, rather than vigorously advocate their client’s positions. Opposing counsel points out that plaintiff had so many lawyers and he still lost every time. And although this may be true, the reason is every lawyer, except one or two, had the propensity to do things harmful to the client, while remarkably always beneficial to the City.”

In retrospect, it is astonishing that the city attorneys, blessed by the city commission, would lay out $800,000 in taxpayer money to persecute this businessman instead of negotiating a compromise. And now they expect to bring the owner of this safe little three-story hotel to ruin by forcing him to pay for their destructive maneuvers. Why, their motion to sanction fees and costs is itself frivolous, supported by a spurious argument that his suit against the city was frivolous because he lost it as a consequence of their malevolent machinations.

We like to believe that the law is as solid as a rock, that there is a very high probability that similar cases will be similarly decided. The truth of the matter is that the positive law is what judges decide from day to day, and that law is always subject to change with the excuse that it should evolve, glacially or not, with the so-called progress of civilization. Forsooth, litigation is a gamble because no one knows for sure what some judge may decide given her prejudices and institutional blindness. Controversy keeps the clock ticking for fees accruing at a rapacious $500 per hour or even more for well connected lawyers.

Judges talk about principles of law and the high ethical standards of the legal profession. In sum, the principle of lawyers is profit in a zero sum game. A law-schooled lawyer in our competitive economy is likely to become a sophist who will do his level best to make even the worst case sound like the best. Overall, the size of the war chest and not the elements of law and highfalutin ethical standards win the battles in the never ending war of all against all. Ironically, the opportunities for litigation and the hordes of attorneys available to resolve differences for a fee is said to be what makes America great.

At least Federal Judge Cecilia M. Altonaga almost brought the billing to an end with her summary rulings, exhibiting the usual prejudice in favor of governmental authority, that it should enjoy the sovereign immunity of a queen or king unless virtually impossible exceptions could be proved. There is a saying that one cannot fight city hall and win, and for good reason.

Eisenberg’s suit for recognition of his civil rights was based on the 1871 Ku Klux Klan Act. Few cases were brought, only a handful were won, and the sections of the act cited by Eisenberg’s lawyers laid dormant for many years until they became a handy instrument for harvesting civil rights controversies for fees.

The Radical Republicans back then figured that federal judges would decide independently of local prejudiced judges and juries. That might hold true if the federal judges were riding a broad circuit. Once resident in the place where cases are decided, judges inured with the local prejudices and institutional blindness of their colleagues. Face it, the judge is more likely to sit with her public attorney kin in the lunchrooms. At least she is prone to sympathizing with them because they are constantly under attack for their decisions. And Judge Altonaga is a human being first of all; she is no stranger to South Florida. Its dominating Cuban?American community wanted to see her sitting on the United States Supreme Court. She was reportedly on President George W. Bush’s short list for the nomination.

Eisenberg’s motion against the sanctions claims that his attorneys decided it would be best of focus on the weakest aspect of his case, that the city was retaliation against him for speaking freely.

That would be sexier, they thought, than emphasizing his strongest point that the city was discriminating against him, not affording him with the equal protection of the laws. Many apartment buildings with short term rentals were not harassed for not having fire sprinklers. Some owners had voluntarily installed sprinklers. He was being picked on.

His brief against the assessment of the city’s fees claims that his attorneys figured juries would be too stupid to understand the equal protection issue, even though, Eisenberg would argue, the issue is rather simple. But I shall provide my own analysis of relevant legal requirements instead of his KISS argument:

Chapter 509-215 of Florida’s firesafety law states that public lodging establishments of three or more stories that have interior corridors without direct access to external means of egress must install sprinklers. The three-story Sadigo does not have interior corridors; the second and third floor apartments have stairs descending to ground level. There are also stairs to the rooftop

And Chapter 509 requires that buildings up to 75-feet high that do have direct adequate external means from guest areas for escape from fire and smoke must have sprinklers if erected prior to 1983.

These provisions apply only to those public lodging establishments in a building wherein more than 50 percent of the units in the building are advertised or held out to the public as available for transient occupancy.

And there is a special exception for historic buildings. The statute refers to national fire prevention standards adopted as law by Florida that mentions systems equivalent to automatic sprinklers. Eisenberg argues that his three-story building has an adequate fire and smoke protection system, which he upgraded at a cost of $40,000 at the city’s request, and is absolutely exempted from the equivalency standard because the intention of the law for historic structures is to prevent disturbing, altering, or destroying their integrity by forcing the installation of fire sprinklers OR alternative systems equivalent to automatic fire sprinkler systems.

Eisenberg claimed that the city attorneys deliberately deceived or lied to the judge about this feature of the law, and that several experts as well as his attorneys were also deceived into becoming “shills” for the city and fire sprinkler companies. His notion that he had become an ATM machine for attorneys on both sides is supported by a June 1, 2015, Notice of Resolution discovered on the docket whereby the city attorneys had resolved their claim for fees against his attorneys, and therefore they were pursuing Eisenberg for the $800,000, despite the evidence that Eisenberg had bowed to his attorneys’ wishes that he trust them as his lawyers to present the correct theory of the case and arguments to the court. How can the court hold him alone responsible for fees to defend against frivolous and groundless arguments, if that is what they were, and not his attorneys, when he relied on their advice in the pleadings? In fact, the rule appertaining to sanctions allows the judge to hold the attorneys signing the pleadings responsible.

Right or wrong, everyone was aboard the same ship, naturally unwilling to cross the source of a great deal of bread and butter. Eisenberg, who has been called a sore loser by the press and a crybaby by city attorneys for fighting for his constitutional rights, was denied equal protection of the laws as a so-called class-of-one. In reality there are hundreds of people in that Category of One who are afraid for good reason to confront the city’s legal mafioso who are no doubt gloating over Eisenberg’s defeat.

The 80-year old Sadigo had been partially occupied by transient guests as was the custom for decades on the beach. Eisenberg had a state license for transient use and was paying resort taxes to the city. The trouble began when he pulled a permit to dedicate some space for preparation and storage of cold food for his Art Basel visitors. City inspectors then defined that space as a “restaurant” although no food was to be sold there to the general public, and reclassified it as a “new” structure. Eisenberg declined to have their guys fix the problem or impliedly pay a bribe after code enforcement insisted that the transient apartment building was a brand new hotel that would have to comply with the fire code of a new hotel instead of an existing hotel. “Transient” occupancy, which allows for two transient uses in the district, is the overriding word: The change from transient apartment to transient hotel, Eisenberg argues, was merely a change in paperwork nomenclature, both uses being allowed within the general occupancy zoning of the neighborhood. Wherefore the Sadigo could not be classified as a new building since the occupancy was essentially the same, i.e. transient.

City officials, especially the clan of city attorneys, apparently had a vendetta going against him as if he were an enemy of the state. Right or wrong, everyone but he was aboard the same ship, naturally unwilling to defy the source of a great deal of bread and butter. Wherefore he was denied equal protection of the laws as a so-called class-of-one inasmuch as only his historic building was selected out of many for specious enforcement. His attorneys, apparently believing equal protection abridgement would be hard to sell to a jury, did not have detectives go out and get comparables to show that similar buildings were allowed without sprinklers, and that he was being picked on because he did not bend over for them. He has apparently now retrieved a list of comparables on his own.

Before I was aware of the Eisenberg Affair, I myself had pointed out that a friend of Eisenberg’s, Scott Robins, an influential developer who has partnered with Mayor Philip Levine in several projects, had operated a transient hotel, the Espanola Suites on Espanola Way, above two restaurants with hot kitchens for several years, and according to the city has not paid resort taxes, after the city denied him a certificate of use. An inspection report available from his recent effort to obtain a certificate for hotel use indicates that the sprinkler system installed during a previous renovation, which may not have been permitted by the city is inadequate for the hotel use. It was only after pressing the issue with Hernan Cardeno, Director of the Code Compliance Department, that Espanola Way Suites was cited and then referred to the Special Master. No explanation was forthcoming from Cardeno was to why the hotel guests were not evicted and the owner arrested as was the case in the Eisenberg Affair. The problem with reporting violations to expose the negligence and corruption of the government is not only retaliation by the officials, but retaliation from the businesses that one would rather not offend.
In any case, Judge Altonaga tossed out Eisenberg’s equal protection argument, in her first round of dismissals in the Summary Judgment Game, for lack of the comparatives that Eisenberg’s attorneys did not collect and press.

And then she tossed the supposedly sexier free speech cause, ruling that it was moot because a principle of current common law, or how judges interpret statutes lately, is that the city itself cannot be held liable for civil rights violations unless it makes the discriminatory policies. It was subject to county review, she said.

Well, then, the problem there is that the county is subject to the state, and the state is immune pursuant to the current misinterpretation of the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution. So nobody is liable.

Judge Altonaga’s institutional blindness to the fact that the city tailor made the policy to put Eisenberg out of business is profound, as can be seen by anyone who thoroughly examines the behavior of the officials concerned and fully understands the confusing hodgepodge of state statutes.

As for the policymaker concept, that is the result of the interpretive vacillations of the also fallible justices of the U.S. Supreme Court. At first it was believed the Congress back in 1871 did not intend municipalities to be “persons” subject to suit to recover damages for civil rights violations. Minds were changed about that, and may and should be changed again, so that such entities are liable for damages for their employees’ behavior, as is the case with businesses. History is again and again conveniently abused to justify current desires.

Eisenberg cited several mistakes made by his lawyers. I note that they did not sue the officers themselves along with the city, which they might have done knowing they might be confronted by sovereign immunity, which is based on the notion that “the King can do no wrong.”

But the King can do wrong, and be beheaded as a consequence. If Eisenberg is right, some heads should roll at city hall. He must have something planned. He is not talking, having learned his lesson the hard way about speaking freely.

# #

Facsimile of Document Retrieved From Public Records
Response to City’s Motion for Approximately $800,000
in City’s Legal Fees and Costs

FILED by___________ D.C.
JUN 04 2015
S. D. of FLA. – MIAMI

Corporation, d/b/a SADIGO COURT


CASE NO.: 1:13-CV-23620-CMA


“I will employ, for purposes of maintaining the causes confided in me such means only as are consistent with truth and honor, and will never seek to mislead tile judge or jury by any artifice of false statement of fact or law.. ”
Supreme Court of Florida, Oath to the Florida Bar, 2011

The Plaintiff, Rod Eisenberg, Pro se, adopts co-counsel’s Response pleading, with its memorandum of law, and files this its own Response to Defendant City of Miami Beach’s Motion for Entitlement to Fees, Costs, and Sanctions, and in support states the following:


As shown below, it is clear and convincing that the City’s attorneys, past and present, have broken the solemn oath above and in turn denied that justice was done. Since the very beginning in 2007, when the first fire violation was posted at plaintiff s property, the City has stubbornly refused to fairly apply the laws and facts in the case of the historic Sadigo Court. Instead, they were only concerned with the end result: forcing a costly fire sprinkler system into a “contributing” historic building, which is exempt from sprinklers as a matter of law. Furthermore, the City also demanded Plaintiff go through the rigorous demands of obtaining a “new” hotel license if it wanted to sell short term rentals. And with the public coffers at their disposal, the City has spent an obscene amount of money to enforce their will.

Plaintiffs reason for going to the recent law firm, SmolkerBartlett(Smolker), are grounded in an equal protection claim that other apartment licensees are being allowed to sell short-term rentals, some with sprinklers, some without; while the Sadigo Court was being forced to obtain a new hotel license and be treated as a “new” hotel for licensing, building and fire code purposes. Correspondences between plaintiff and Smolker prior to them agreeing to represent client centered around the equal protection claim, not the free-speech claims that later engulfed the case. (see Exhibit 1) They later told client the equal protection case would be dull and boring to a jury. Instead, the free-speech angle would be interesting for a jury. They also said juries were not very intelligent as a whole to understand the complex zoning and land-use issues.

The issues in this case are very simple and upfront. The City had to embark on a scheme of smoke and mirrors in order to achieve a win at any and all cost. Their well-executed plan consisted of misrepresenting to the Court the necessity of a hotel license, when the current apartment license is good enough in a RM-2 zoning district. The City then unreasonably demanded that the “contributing” historic building be brought up to the same codes applicable for new hotel construction, which mandated fire sprinklers, as well as widening historic exterior stairwells. They argued their hands are tied because the process they deceptively labeled a “change of occupancy”, demanded it.

This City has a disturbing view of what our government is suppose to stand for. Instead of being a government of the people, by the people and for the people, this government is against its people, or at least the ones that have the moral resolve to challenge its absurd edicts, which in this case involved transient rental s and fire safety. Incredulously, this government will ask a property owner to disregard the rule of law, and only be concerned about the amount of money it will cost to fight their unwarranted demands. And since they have the public coffers, with no accountability, the City will guarantee one will spend much more money fighting them, then adhering to their unnecessary and unlawful demands.

If the facts and law do show that a sprinkler system is not actually mandated, then the City’s underhanded practices to force a historic property owner to install the unnecessary fire system would be tantamount to extortion. This Court even stated during a status hearing midway through the case that if the City got it all wrong on the sprinklers, “..that is just going to facto r into damages if your{Mr. Kairalla} assessment is incorrect.” (see Transcript of Court Hearing-7/2 l/1 4, p. 12). Due to misrepresentations by opposing counsel, this court never had the opportunity to analysis the codes, laws and facts in the case to see if indeed a sprinkler system was ever legally required for the “contributing” historic Sadigo Court.

That being said, the strong parts of plaintiff’s case, negating any talk of the action being frivolous, unreasonable or without foundation are as follows:

1) Plaintiff had given to prior counsel a list of other “comparators”, other apartment licensees selling short-term transient rentals, with or without the so-called requisite fire sprinklers, and not having to undergo a “change of occupancy” to hotel. Plaintiff/client should not be penalized for the failure of counsel to submit a list of comparators.

2) The Sadigo Court did not have to undergo a “change of occupancy” from apartment to hotel, thus triggering FFPC Ch. 28 for “new” hotels , because, if anything, the change would only be a “change of use”. That triggers FFPC Ch. 29 for “existing” hotels , which has significantly different requirements than its Ch. 28 counterpart, such as exempting existing buildings under 75 ft. from the sprinkler requirement. ( theSadigo Court is only 38 feet.)

3) City’s “Exhibit 1 &ll”, obtained through discovery in this case, both show unequivocally that opposing counsel misrepresented when he wrote to this Court there was a sprinkler mandate for all transient facilities, “without exception”. (see Exhibit 2) Opposing counsel’s shameful fear-mongering regarding possibility of guests burning in a future fire should not trump Court’s integrity that mandates it to respect the fire codes and statutes already in place that specifically exempt a building exactly like the historic Sadigo Court.

4) Notwithstanding City’s representations, Florida Statutes 509.215, the authoritative law concerning public lodging establishments and fire sprinklers, with its paragraph #4 exception for “contributing historic structures” from sprinklers, does apply to Sadigo Court. It clearly states the Historic Task Force “shall” accept the SadigoCourt’ s exception from sprinklers. Also contrary to City’s argument, the statute applies to both transient and non-transient public lodging establishments, (see F.S. 509.013(4)(a); F.S. 509.242(1) in Exhibit 11). As this Court recalls, City had been arguing that “FS 509.215 does not apply because the Sadigo was not licensed as a transient public lodging establishment prior to 1994”.

5) The validity of the numerous “Cease & Desist Orders” issued by local fire marshal prior to 2013 are null and void since the local fire marshal does not have authority to issue those orders under FS 633.161. Therefore, all those shutdowns in 2011 were invalid and City should be responsible for those damages.


I. There are Many Comparators

Plaintiffs’ case was not frivolous because Plaintiff knew there were many other apartment buildings selling short-term rentals and they were not being harassed like the Sadigo Court by calling it “an illegal hotel”. Plaintiff had even given to prior counsel that list of other “comparators”, other apartment licensees selling short-term transient rentals, with or without the so-called requisite fire sprinklers, and not having to undergo a “change of use” or a “change of occupancy” to hotel. (1)
(1)Besides the apartment licensees listed in Exhibit 2, there are many comparators selling short term rentals without sprinklers, such as the Tradewinds Apt./Hotel(2365 PineTree Dr.) European Guest House(721 Michigan Ave.) and Sobe Bed & Breakfast (1018 Jefferson Ave.) and some with sprinklers, such as the Espanola Suites (443 Espanola Dr.), Metropole Hotel(6 35 Collins Ave.), Sunbrite Apartments(1330 Penn. Ave..) BesaroSuites(255 W. 24 St.) and the Lincoln Arms (1800 James Ave.), which happens to be located in the same RM-2 district as Sadigo Court. There are also some newly renovated hotels such as the Clifton Hotel (1343 Collins Ave), Villa Italia Hotel (354 Washington Ave) selling short-term transient rentals without sprinklers. And of course, we have not even mentioned the numerous units in condos that sell short-term rentals, many that do not have sprinklers.
In other words, the Sadigo never needed a “new” certificate of occupancy for a hotel because its original apartment license is good enough in a RM-2 zoning district to sell short-term rentals. Plaintiff’s counsel in this case, Smolker Bartlett, promised to amend complaint and submit comparators at the appropriate time, however, they never did and it is still a mystery today why they did not. Plaintiff/client should not be penalized for the failure of counsel to submit a list of comparators.

For years, plaintiff had been trying to have his numerous counsels simply submit a list of other apartment licensees that sell short term rentals, but done ever did. Furthermore, no attorney ever objected to the City’s repeatedly misrepresenting the need for a hotel license when they stated to a state court judge:
“Apartment use does not allow transient utilization of the premises.” City Atty. Boksner, p. 20; “Transient would require… change their certificate of use as a hotel.” City Atty. Montoya, p. 45; “If he wants to operate as a transient apartment under state law, he also has to operate as a hotel under City law.” City Atty. Held, p. 47 [Transcript of Court Proceedings dated 6/30/11, Eisenberg v. City of Miami Beach, Case No. 11-20234 CA 22. {(App’x II Ex. 9) ECF No. 53-9}]
On June 27, 2011, City gave code compliance violation CE # 11010866- “Correct BTR is for apartments. Owner is utilizing the property as a hotel with transient short-term rentals.”. Clearly in this case and in every other related case, the City does not want to acknowledge the existence of local apartment licensees(BTR #900) that legally operate transient short-term rentals.

Inexplicably, the City has destroyed its credibility by representing that apartment licensees are not allowed to sell short term rentals.

The City also has argued that the Sadigo Court without fire sprinklers is a “imminent danger”. If that were true then why would the late renowned architect, Les Beilinson, a historic specialist, state at a Aug. 19th, 2010 Task Force hearing that: “the Sadigo Court is one of the safest buildings I have ever been in”. If the sprinkler requirement were true, you would not have multiple state DBPR inspectors pass the Sadigo and note in their Lodging Inspection Reports that sprinklers are not applicable. (see Exhibit 16) The City fire marshal has told the plaintiff on many occasions that “the only reason your experts agree with you is because you pay them”, This warped cynicism should not diminish the solid foundation of plaintiff’s case built on expert fire-engineer testimony, fire codes and statutes.

II. It’s a “Change of Use”, not a “Change of Occupancy”

Plaintiff thought the foundation of his case was solid because apartments have a “vested” right to sell short- term rentals in Sadigo’ s RM-2 district. However, if the tribunals think the Sadigo has to be a “hotel, ” then the process is only a “change of use”. That label has beneficial ramifications on the Sadigo Court’s sprinkler issue because “changes of use” trigger FFPC, Ch. 29, and Ch. 29 exempts existing hotel-like structures under 75 feet. The Sadigo is under 38 ft. As proof, the FFPC, Ch. 43.7.1 states: “A change in use that does not involve a change of occupancy shall comply with the requirements applicable to the new use{hotel} in accordance with the applicable existing occupancy chapter {i.e. , Ch. 29}……. ”

Opposing counsel also argues that plaintiff also lost his malpractice case against the original law firm who agreed with the fire marshal that Sadigo Court needed sprinklers. However, the judge in that case tangentially ruled that the process is a “change of use”, having repeated the phrase 7 times in his order. (see Exhibit 5-0rder dated 6/2/14) Opposing counsel cannot have it both ways: He cannot bring in the legal malpractice Order against plaintiff, and still argue it’s a “change of occupancy”. Labels do matter. In fact, it is important to realize that in the January 22, 2014 hearing before this judge, opposing counsel alluded to the change from apartment to hotel as a “change in use”, or “that new use….” ; “another type of use…. “; “change from one use….to another use…..”. Notice how opposing counsel does not mention the word “occupancy” when discussing the process because he knows, as all the experts know, that the change, if anything, is just a “change of use”.

If labels don’t matter, then why would opposing counsel surreptitiously recast the phrase “change of use” to now being a “change of occupancy” later in the case? As discussed above, the answer lies in the fact that “changes of use” exempt existing hotels under 75 feet. as per FFPC, Ch. 29. Instead of acknowledging this innocuous fact, opposing counsel has used its vast financial resources to make it appear it is a “change of occupancy” and then arguing that FFPC, Ch. 28 applies because Sadigo Court must be treated like a “newly” constructed hotel in the eyes of the fire code. This is absolutely false, as the City’s own “Exhibit I ” shows many times the process being a “change of use”. (see Exhibit 2)

Although plaintiff’s counsel originally argued there was neither a change of use, nor a change of occupancy, it is strange and unexplainable why Plaintiff s counsel would, toward the end of case, now advise their client that Sadigo now has to undergo a “Change of Occupancy” to a hotel. (see Exhibit 3- Cremer email dated 10/29/14).

This is particularly unsettling because the City’s expert, SLS Consulting, Inc., the City’s Exhibit 1, which list at least 12 examples of “change of use”, and a Miami Dade County Letter all point to the process, if necessary , being a “change of use”. (see Exhibit 4)

Despite all the evidence above that shows the process, if anything is a “change of use”, the City success fully branded the Sadigo’s process as a “change of occupancy” in all the Task Force, BORA as well as in the most recent Fire Appeals Board hearing. (3 City’s Verified Response, Miami Dade Fire Appeals Board , p.2, 8/2/14) The reason why those results should not count and the reason why petitioner/plaintiff had to withdraw his petition every time is due to the fact that the false “change of occupancy” label was accepted by these tribunals without any open discussion or input from other parties.

III. Florida Statutes 509.215(4) Should Apply to Sadigo Court

Plaintiff s actions were not frivolous nor unreasonable because there is a statute directly on point that should have cleared Sadigo Court from sprinklers, if we are to read these statutes in their plain and obvious meaning. As noted above, the original DBPR hotel inspector, as well as a subsequent inspector, passed the Sadigo Court concerning sprinklers, writing, “N/A” and/or “Yes” on the line-item for compliance. [see both DBPR, Division of Hotels, Lodging Inspection Reports dated 7/10/08 and 5/13/10 (Exhibit 16)] They freely passed Sadigo because they knew all “contributing” historic buildings like the Sadigo Court are exempt from sprinklers as a matter of law, as per 509.215(4). That has been the law of the land since 1983. So it is misleading to say no one ever agreed with Sadigo on the issue of fire sprinklers.

As City’s Exhibit 1 & 2 shows, there are other establishments that are allowed to sell short-term rentals without sprinklers because of the exceptions dictated in F.S. 509.215(1) & (2). However, the Sadigo is not allowed to use the 4th paragraph, written to exempt certain types of historic buildings. One of the reasons the City argues that point is because the Task Force never approved of its petition for exemption from sprinklers. This is a gross misrepresentation of what the role of the Task Force is.

Paragraph #4 of F.S. 509.2 15 mandates: “In attempting to discern legislative intent, we first look to the actual language used in the statute”. Joshua v. City of Gainesville, 768 So.2d 432, 435 (Fla.2000); accord BellSouth Telecomms., Inc. v. Meeks, 863 So.2d 287,289 (Fla.2003). “When the statute is clear and unambiguous, courts will not look behind the statute ‘s plain language for legislative intent or resort to rules of statutory construction to ascertain intent”. See Lee County Elec. Coop..Inc. v. Jacobs, 820 So.2d 297, 303 (Fla.2002). “In such instance, the statute’s plain and ordinary meaning must control, unless this leads to an unreasonable result or a result clearly contrary to legislative intent “. See State v. Burris, 875 So.2d 408, 410 (Fla.2004). When the statutory language is clear, “courts have no occasion to resort to rules of construction – they must read the statute as written, for to do otherwise would constitute an abrogation of legislative power .”Nicoll v. Baker, 668 So.2d 989, 990-9 1 (Fla.1996)
“Special exception to the [sprinkler] provision shall be made for contributing historic structures ……..When recommending alternative systems {to a sprinkler system}, the task force shall consider systems which would not disturb , destroy, or alter the integrity of such historic structures .”
No where does this imply that the Task Force has leeway to approve or disapprove of the exception. Instead, it makes it mandatory for the fire tribunals to accept the “exception” from sprinklers and to recommend alternative systems to a sprinkler system that meet the intent of the NFPA- something they have failed to do in 3 Task Force Hearings, a BORA hearing and/or a Fire Appeals Board hearing. Since the language is so clear and unambiguous, the case law cited [above] does not permit any fire official, nor this Court, to abuse their given right to interpret and instead create new law.

The City is rewriting the Task Force’s mandate without any legislative authority. In other words, if opposing counsel does not like what a statute says, he will just make something up, ala Brian Williams. For example, in the Fire Appeals Board case the City further embellishes its misrepresentation of the law by arguing 509.215 only applies to “transient” facilities licensed before 1994, notwithstanding the law defines a public lodging establishment, as either “transient” or “non-transient” . Opposing counsel then reasons that since Sadigo Court did not get its state transient license until 2008, then 509.215 does not apply. According to the City, the authority for this strange interpretation is a former fire marshal who is no longer employed with the City and a SFM declaratory statement that does not apply to historic buildings, which the Sadigo Court is. The declaratory statement has been overturned by the enactment of FFPC 28.3.5, which does exempt new 3 & 4 story hotels from sprinklers with exterior walkways. Thus, as a matter of law, there is no universal sprinkler mandate, rather just a massive scheme to deceive this Court into thinking there was one.

This Court has previously warned opposing counsel to stop making statements about the correct statutory interpretation s without citing any authority regarding those interpretations. (see Order dated 3/3/14, p. 10, footnote #5)

It appears opposing counsel is cutting and pasting statutes together to create a new statute that fits their needs. The Canons of the Florida Bar, 4-3.3, do not allow officers of the Court to cut and paste statute sections together and pass them off as genuine. Opposing counsel cuts the phrase “transient only” from the Uniform Fire-Safety Standards, F.S. 633.022(1)(b), which only does apply to transient public lodging establishments.

[Opposing counsel does cite In The Matter Of Sonia Machen, Case No.1 05114-09-FM for the proposition that FS 509.215(1)(2) does not apply to Sadigo Court. However, the Statement does say that: “All buildings that are not within those parameters are required to meet Ch. 633…. ” (Id, p. 13) As we now know, F.S. 633 is the FFPC, which is then only Ch. 29, not 28 and Ch. 29 exempts all existing buildings like the Sadigo under 75 feet. So even using the Machen Statement, the Sadigo satisfies it by satisfying FFPC, Ch. 29. Furthermore, on p. 1 of the Dec. Statement it states: “If any of the facts asserted by the Petitioner [fire marshal] are untrue or materially incomplete, the conclusions of the Declaratory Statement could be significantly different. ” The fact that this statement mentions the word “historic” zero times, it is clear that this statement does not apply to historic buildings. Machen failed to account for the historic status of the structure in her analysis and thus should invalidate the use of this statement.]

Opposing counsel then extrapolates the “before 1994” date from F.S. 633.022(2)(b), which allows the local authority to require more strict sprinkler requirements for those buildings built after Jan. 1, 1994, only if a special local sprinkler ordinance is passed. [The City has never passed such an ordinance, thus the Florida Fire Prevention Code is the Uniform Fire-Safety Standard for the state of Florida, as well as the City of Miami Beach. (see F.S. 633.0215(1))] Opposing counsel has then blended these phrases together in their interpretation of FS 509.215.

This cutting and pasting of statutes and representing them as whole in a federal court case has substantially interfered with this Court’s ability to adjudicate the matter fairly. This Court has trusted opposing counsel and that trust has been broken by this unauthorized creation of new law designed to win the case at any and all costs, even if that cost is in the Court’s integrity and fairness in the legal system.

The Legislature has spoken on this issue of historic buildings and fire sprinklers by enacting F.S. 509.2 15(4), with its historic exception to the FS 509.215(2) general sprinkler rule mandated for buildings built before 1983. Although the AHJ does have the last say on interpretation of these codes and statutes, the AHJ does not have authority to rewrite them. The Florida Legislature has also adopted the NFPA’ s 914, Code f or Fire Protection of Historic Structures. The City does not like to talk about this codebook because it also allows historic buildings to utilize many “methods” of compliance, such as the submission of “Equivalency Reports”, in lieu of compliance with any requirement, including even sprinklers. (see NFPA 914, Ch. 8.1) Once again, the City, opposing counsel and/or this Court does not have authority to change the plain and obvious meaning of these “unambiguous” fire codes and statutes that all in one way or another, exempt a historic building just like the Sadigo Court from sprinklers. Therefore, it is the City who does not want to comply with the fire code sections and statutes that exempt the Sadigo Court. If they do not like the outcome of certain laws, then let the fire marshal lobby the State Legislature to change the laws. But for now, the fire marshal must obey the law, not re-write it.

IV. Misrepresentation ofCity Fire Marshal ‘s Authority to Issue Cease & Desist Orders, pursuant to F.S. 633.118

Plaintiffs action s were not frivolous nor without foundation because the Florida Legislature has made it clear that local fire marshals are not agents of the State Fire Marshal’s Office. (see F.S. 633.118, formally 633.121) Given the enormous power and responsibility, the Legislature does not want local fire officials to have to ability to have persons arrested for fire code violations. This is exclusively reserved for the state fire marshal under the state statue 633.228(3), formally 633.161. For good reason, the Florida Legislature only wants State Fire Marshal personnel to be the ones initiating the action to arrest someone. It is general common knowledge that the further down one goes in state and local government, the more likely one is to find people holding technical jobs for which they are not sufficiently qualified by education or experience.

Knowing a local fire official, acting independently of the State Fire Marshal’s Office, could not have the plaintiff arrested for violating local fire dept. “Notices of Violations”, the fire marshal conspired with other local fire marshals to come up with a plan to have plaintiff arrested. (see Exhibit 6- Machen email dated 9/16/1 I-obtained in discovery from City) That conversation resulted in City Fire Marshal continually citing F.S. 633.228 (formerly 633.161) and issuing many “Cease & Desist Orders” pursuant to it, which does allow violators to be arrested. (see FS 633.124) However, the facts show, as evidenced by the email chain, all those knew the authority to “issue” would not extend to the local fire officials and there was no evidence of any coordination with the State Fire Marshal’s Office on the issuance of those Cease & Desist Orders back in 2007-2012.

Additionally, a well-known SFM Declaratory Stmt., In the Matter of Wagner, 128015- 12-FM, confirms the long-standing common knowledge that local fire officials may not issue cease and desist orders under Ch. 633, although they can enforce properly issued Cease & Desist Orders under FS 633 and MD County Sec. 14-44. Even opposing counsel admits that “In re Wagner does fi nd 633.161 inapplicable to municipal officials… “. However, opposing counsel then misrepresents that the local fire marshal has the authority given by other means, such as NFPA 1 Sec.,1.7.7,1.7.14. (see Exhibit 11)

A closer look at those sections reveal that all they do is give the AHJ authority to “order person to remove dangerous ..condition…”, (Sec.; or “Where dangerous conditions exist….AHJ shall have authority to abate such hazardous conditions…. /I (Sec. 1.7.7); or “The AHJ shall have authority to order an operation or use stopped ….when such building has hazardous conditions… /I ( see Sec. 1.7.14). These are obvious authorities that do not need explaining, however nowhere does it state the AHJ can issue Cease & Desist Orders that subsequently result in the violator being arrested. It is bad faith for opposing counsel to make those representations of a conveyance of authority when in fact they say nothing of the kind. Opposing counsel misrepresents that in addition to the above, the City also has authority to issue Cease & Desist orders as per the City Municipal Code, 50-4(i), and to have persons arrested for fire code violations.

[See Exhibit 7- Ordinance No. 2013-3813, where City unilaterally gave itself the powers the State Legislature said are specifically reserved for State Fire Marshal: the power to issue Cease& Desist Orders pursuant to F.S. 633.]

However, the City modified that municipal code section only in Oct. 2013. Therefore, all those “Cease & Desist Orders” issued prior to 2013, that led to multiple shutdowns of plaintiff s business and his eventual arrest, should be null & void ab initio, as the local fire marshal did not have authority to issue them. Thus, the plaintiffs arrest for violating those “Cease & Desist Orders” should also be null & void, ab initio. So not only did the local fire marshal know her scheme had defects, she carried them out anyways, in such reckless fashion, that opposing counsel had no choice but to deceive this court and suppress this information. Smolker did raise this argument in a Nov. ’14 motion, however it was too little too late, as this Court denied the motion as being moot after it granted City’s motion for final summary judgment.

V. Fire Marshal Does Have Leeway to Exempt Sprinklers

It is also misleading for the City to argue that its hands are tied regarding the mandate of fire sprinklers. This is because the City of Miami Beach never formally enacted any ordinance requiring more strict guidelines for sprinklers. Since Sadigo Court is not a “new” hotel structure, nor undergoing a “change of occupancy”, there is no fire code section that requires sprinklers in an existing 38’ tall hotel-like structure. If there is, then let opposing counsel produce it. Furthermore, F.S. 633.022(2)(b), the Uniform Fire Safety Standards, specifically states that the “local authority may, on a case-by-case basis, in order to meet special situations arising from ….historic….conditions…..authorize equivalent alternative standards”.

Although it is an apartment building by its occupational license, it is an existing hotel, by fire code definition FFPC, Ch. 29 which states: “the term hotel …..shall include a hotel, an inn, a club, a motel, a bed and breakfast, or any other structure meeting the definition of a hotel i. e., transient apartment”}.The Sadigo was built actually as a transient apartment house, hence the original name, Sadigo Court Apartment Hotel, and thus satisfies FFPC Ch. 29, as only existing hotels over 75 feet must be sprinklered.

Also, in FS 509.215(4) , it states the AHJ or fire official shall grant an exception to the fire sprinkler requirement for “contributing” historic structures like the Sadigo Court. In the fire code, the definition of “shall” means a mandatory requirement. (see FFPC Ch. 3.2.6) Ironically, opposing counsel is deceiving this Court into thinking a fire marshal has no leeway into exempting fire sprinklers under the laws and codes. In all actuality, under the FS 509 statute it is the AHJ and tribunal s like the Task Force that have no leeway in denying the exception from sprinklers for a “contributing” historic structure like the Sadigo Court.

VI. Blatant Misrepresentation of Local Ordinance

Plaintiffs actions regarding Count V were not frivolous because the apartment licensees have a “vested right” in an RM-2 zoning district to sell short-term rentals. Additionally, plaintiff cited the new “Vacation Rental Law”, FS 509.032(7)(b), as added proof that it could sell short-term rentals without changing its license because as of the statute’s enactment date of June 2, 2011, there were no city ordinances on the books restricting short-term rentals in any RM-2 district. [Although the new short-term rental statute creates a new category of Transient establishments, “vacation rentals”, the new law generally prohibits municipalities, unless they have a law prior to June2, 2011, from restricting short-term rentals on the basis of occupancy classification, i.e., apartment, bed and breakfast, single-family, rooming house, etc….(see also White Paper: “ShortTerm Rental Housing Restrictions”, Robinson & Cole, LLP, p. 13-14 (2011- Exhibit 12)] However, the City brazenly argued that plaintiffs use of that landmark law is “irrelevant and a classic red-herring” because it already had an ordinance , # 20 I0-3685 , that restricted short-term rental s and existed prior to June 2, 2011. (see Exhibit 8) Remarkably, this in part caused the Court to dismiss plaintiffs Count V when that ordinance clearly does not even apply to Sadigo’s RM-2 zoning district! Thus, the City has repeatedly mislead Courts into believing it already had an ordinance restricting Sadigo’s short-term rentals, when in actuality it never did back then and it does not have one today.

VII. A Lot of Billings, Very Little Results

Although there is no guarantee of success in civil litigation, a plaintiff must be certain his attorneys are not succumbing to the City’s arguments because they would rather treat their client like a ATM, rather than vigorously advocate their client’s positions. Opposing counsel points out that plaintiff had so many lawyers and he still lost every time. And although this may be true, the reason is every lawyer, except one or two, had the propensity to do things harmful to the client, while remarkably always beneficial to the City.

Plaintiffs original lawyers back in 2007 advised him that being a “contributing” historic building is irrelevant when considering sprinklers and there are no statutes, fire code sections or otherwise that can help the historic Sadigo Court stave off a mandate of sprinklers from a local fire marshal, as she is the “Authority Having Jurisdiction”. That same lawyer never advised client that he could engage a fire engineer to submit a sealed and certified “Equivalency Report” that remediates the sprinkler requirement, as per NFPA 914, Code for Historic Structures and/or Florida Building Code, Existing, Ch. 1105/6. It is no coincidence that the City now claims all those Equivalency Reports are unacceptable. It is also no coincidence that opposing counsel now cites these “previous attorney, architect and engineer” as one of the groups who disagreed with their client’s assessment regarding historic buildings and fire sprinklers.

That same firm never advised their client that Sadigo Court can have a State Transient Apartment License, along with its local apartment license, and still sell short-term rentals. Instead, it advised Sadigo that if it wanted to sell short term rentals it would have to undergo a change to hotel and obtain new licenses in order to operate. The City has spent its resources these past eight years backing up the well-connected land-u se law firm, as well as their incorrect determinations regarding, land-use, fire codes and sprinklers. It is palpable that the City and plaintiff could have resolved this back in 2007 if the law firm only honestly advocated on behalf of its client that: 1) the Sadigo Court is an apartment licensee with “vested” rights that allow it to sell short-term rentals in its RM-2 zoning district and 2) it can do so without sprinklers due to the fact that Sadigo is also a “contributing” historic structure, as per FS 509.215(4).

In yet another disappointing display of legal advocacy, another law firm representing client in over two days of hearings, failed to advise the state court judge in the injunctive-relief case involving the City back in 20 II , that the Sadigo is located in a RM-2 zoning district. This is crucial when determining the right to sell short-term rentals. That same lawyer changed plaintiff’s affidavit without informing client and client mistakenly signed it where it stated “after the hearing I protested in a judge’s chamber” . Not only was this not true, but it unfairly cast client as litigious crybaby that rudely protest bad decisions. [see Exhibit 9- Truitt email to client dated 7/12/11] Fortunately, the attorney agreed to change the paragraph in question the next day and this is reflected on the docket sheet in case. However, the damage was already done. The incorrect affidavit still remains on the books and was even sent up on appeal as part of the City’s Appendix to Appellee’s Answer Brief instead of the corrected one.

[See Exhibit 10- City’s Appendix to Answer Brief, Eisenberg Dev. Corp. v. City of Miami Beach, Case No. 3D12-362, filed 4/26/12]

Also, that same lawyer, despite City attorneys making those previously mentioned false statements regarding apartments inability to sell short-term rental s, failed to lodge one objection. The City, during those same two days, lodged 15 objections. (see Transcripts on 6/30/1 1 & 7/6/11 in Eisenberg v. City of Miami Beach. Case No. 11 -20234 CA 22) Another lawyer filed a crucial memorandum of law too late before a hearing regarding a motion for relief from judgment that the judge refused to read or accept. The memo contained exculpatory evidence showing the Planning Director stating that after the landmark state short-term rental law, F.S. 509.032(7) became effective, it restricts City’s ability to prevent certain apartment licensees from selling short-term rentals.

[12 see Exhibit 11- Memorandum of Law in Support for Motion for Relief from Judgment. Eisenberg Dev. Corp. v. City of Miami Beach, Case No.I I-2 0234 CA 01(15), filed two days before 4/30/13 hearing and was not accepted by Judge Rodriguez. Smolker Bartlett attorneys advised plaintiff to voluntarily dismiss this state court motion for relief under Fl. Rules of Civ. Pro. 1.540(b), which plaintiff did.]

So as one can see, it has been a calamity of errors perpetrated by the numerous attorneys who all thought client had a great case at the onset, only to result in them doing something incompetent and benefitting the City in the end. This was plaintiffs experience dealing with lawyers on this case: they always did things that ended up hurting plaintiff s position or reputation. In good faith, plaintiff has spent hundreds of thousands of dollars, in respect of the litigation process, to have able legal counsel independently evaluate and consult through the issues involving short-term rentals and fire safety. However, all that money still resulted in the City’s campaign of misrepresentation of the statutes, facts and code sections, resulting in unjustified victories at every turn.


Despite the City’s arguments that plaintiff s case is frivolous, without any foundation , the above shows the exact opposite. Plaintiffs case was strong because there actually are many comparators, that is apartment licensees selling short-term rentals . The only problem plaintiff had was getting their lawyer,, to provide them to this Court. Even if this Court believed that the Sadigo must change into a hotel, that change is only a “change of use”, not a “change of occupancy”. Thus the applicable fire code chapter is Ch. 29, not Ch. 28 and Ch. 29 exempts all existing hotels under 75 ft. So the Sadigo does comply with FFPC. It also complies with the Uniform Fire Safety Standards because under Florida law the uniform Standards are the same standards as the FFPC. (see Rule 69A-43.019- Exhibit 12)

Sadigo also complies with FS 509.215(4) because it is a “contributing” historic structure. City once again misrepresents to this Court that FS 509.215 only applies to transient public lodging establishments that were licensed prior to 1994. As shown above, FS 509.215 applies to both non-transient and transient public lodging establishments. The City also misrepresented to this Court by stating there is a universal sprinkler mandate for all transient establishments, “without exception”. This is absolutely false as shown by the numerous buildings in Exhibits 1& 2 provided by City selling short-term rentals without sprinklers.

Lastly, the City has recklessly issued those Cease & Desist Orders from 2007-2012 without having the proper authority to do so and thus they are null and void, ab initio. With its unlimited public resources, the City has maligned the case and caused the legal process to be unfair. They have created problems for plaintiff when none should have existed. Thus, as the above shows, one does not need to have an expertise in fire sprinklers to know that the Sadigo Court is exempt from sprinklers, as a matter of law. The only problem is that this City does not wish to acknowledge that law and has spent obscene amounts of money to distort the truth in the laws and fire codes. For this reason alone, they clearly are a government not for its people. They should not be permitted to allow their numerous misrepresentations to dictate the narrative of this case. Doing justice in a case and obeying the Canons of the Florida Bar are more important than achieving a win at any and all cost. Therefore, Plaintiff respectfully request this Court to deny Defendant’s motion for entitlement and grant such other relief as the court deems just and appropriate.


I HEREBY CERT1FY that on 6/4/15, I filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court and sent filing to all counsel and parties of record on this 4th day of JUNE, 2015.

334 20th St
Miami Beach, Florida 33139
Tel. No. 305-812- 7125
Fax. No. 305-672-9135
BY: Rod Eisenberg, Pro Se


1. Letters to Smolker Bartlett, et al dated June 18, 2013 and Aug. 3, 20 13
2. City’s “Exhibit 1”- those apartment s that changed to hotel and “Exhibit 2”-apartments that are selling short term rentals.
3. Cremer email dated 10/29/l4
4. City’s Exhibit 1; SLS Consulting, Inc. Report; Miami-Dade County Letter dated 3/12 /09
5. Order dated 6/2/14 in Eisenberg v. Bercow et al., Case NO. 11-22415 CA 0 I
6. Fire Marshal Machen email dated 9/16/11-obtained in discovery from City
7. CMB Ordinance No. 2013-3813
8. City’s Motion to Dismiss, page 17 of 19, footnote 14, dated 11/22/13 in case at bar and 9 City’s Response, p. 4, footnote #2, dated 4/29/1 3 in Eisenberg v. City of Miami Beach, Case # 11-20234 CA 15)
9. Truitt email to client dated 7/12/11
10. Excerpts from original affidavit and corrected affidavit dated 7/12/11
11. F.A. C. 61C- 1.002(4)(a) ; “Short-Term Rental Housing Restrictions”, a White Paper, Robinson & Cole, LLP, p. 13-14 (2011) Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Relief from Judgment. Eisenberg Dev. Corp. v. City of Miami Beach , Case No. 11 -20234 CA 01(1 5)
12. NFPA 1, Sec., 1.7.7,1.7.14; NFPA 914, Ch. 8.1; FS 509.2 15; FS 509.013(4); FS 509.242(1) ; FS 633.161 ; FS 633.118 ; FS 633.022; FFPC, Ch. 3.2.6, Ch. 28, Ch. 29, Ch. 43.7; Uniform Fire Safety Standards, Ch. 69A-43; CMB Municipal Code, Sec. 50-4
13. Misc. CMB Fire Inspection Reports Case No. FIlI 002750; Fl 11002910; FI 11004345
14. Misc. non-hotel licensees selling short-term rentals
15. Misc. Code violations cases- CE# 11010866; CE# 12002753
16. DBPR Lodging inspection Report s dated 7/10 /08 and 5/13/1 0
17. SFM Declaratory Statement, In the Matter of Sonia Machen, Case No. 105114-09-FM; SFM Declaratory Statement, In the Matter of Wagner, Case No. 12801 5-12-FM
18. CMB Ordinance , # 2010-3685
19. Florida Bar, Rule 4-3.3- Candor Toward the Tribunal; Attorney’s Oath of Admission to the Florida Bar



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